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INTRODUCTION
In the apocryphal Case of the Kettle, one thing is plain: The de-
fendant has no liability for the damage to the plaintiff s pot. This may
be because he never borrowed it, or because it was cracked when he
borrowed it, or because it was sound when he returned it.' Murray v.
t Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra Univer-
sity School of Law (lawemf@hofstra.edu). B.A., Yale University, 1975; M.A., Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington (New Zealand), 1977; J.D., Yale University, 1979. As described in
more detail infra note 17, I was peripherally involved as counsel in the Giarratano litigation.
More recently, I served as Reporter for the American Bar Association's latest revision of its
death penalty representation guidelines. See GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 913, 915 (2003); see also infta notes 13-14 and accompanying text. The opinions ex-
pressed in this Article, however, are attributable solely to me.
This Article originated as a presentation at a scholarly conference entitled "The Great
Writ: Developments in the Law of Habeas Corpus," which took place at Cornell Law School
on April 2, 2005. The Article has benefited from the insights of my fellow participants,
from the data collection efforts of Paul Morrow of the Tennessee Post Conviction De-
fender's Office and Federal Public Defender Randy Bauman, and from the skillful re-
search support of Cindie Leigh of the Deane Law Library of Hofstra Law School, Richard
Corbi of the Hofstra Law School Class of 2005, and Michael Weiner. The Article seeks to
take account of developments through January 2006.
1 See ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 466 (2d ed. 1989). The borrowed
object has also appeared over the years as a lawn mower, see Astor Chauffeured Limousine
Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,J.), a pail,
see Dawson v. Pogue, 22 P. 637, 644 (Or. 1889) (per curiam), and a skillet, see Rogers v.
Ratcliff, 48 (3 Jones) N.C. 225, 230 (1855).
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Giarratano2 is a similar case. Although courts continue citing to it for
the proposition that there is no right to counsel in state capital post-
conviction proceedings,3 when one reaches the legal bottom line by
any of the several available routes that proposition proves to be as
dead as "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie." 4 Indeed, I will
argue that it was never alive in the first place. Like Bowers v. Hardwick5
before Lawrence v. Texas overruled it,6 Giarratano is a scarecrow,
whether because in concrete instances the decision actually supports
rather than negates the existence of the claimed right,7 or because
legislative changes have made the case irrelevant,8 or because it
should be overruled either as wrong when decided 9 or wrong now.10
But unless judges, lawyers, and legislators recognize that Giar-
ratano is an illusion, they will permit themselves to be scared off the
path of basic justice, with fatal consequences in the real world."' The
2 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
14 See, e.g., Morris v. Dretke, 90 Fed. Appx. 62, 69 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (upholding
the lower court's decision that because "there is no constitutional right to an attorney in
state post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in such proceedings"), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 823 (2004); King v. State,
808 So. 2d 1237, 1245 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that the "claim must fail because
both Florida law and the Federal law makes clear that a defendant has no constitutional
right to effective collateral counsel").
4 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
5 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6 539 U.S. 558.
7 See infra Part IV; cf Donald A. Dripps, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Law of Standing:
Noncases Make Bad Law, 44 EMORY L.J. 1417, 1418 (1995) (noting that Hardwick did not
face actual injury, and arguing that the Court would have reached the opposite result "in a
concrete case in which an individual suffered actual injury solely on account of private
consensual sexual behavior").
8 See infra Part II; cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (noting that the number of states
with statutes banning sodomy had fallen from twenty-five at the time of Bowers to thirteen
at the time of Lawrence, and further noting that states that had retained such laws exhibited
a "pattern of nonenforcement").
9 Cf Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided").
10 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text; cf Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding
that Bowers "is not correct today"); Matthew Coles, The Meaning ofRomer v. Evans, 48 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1343, 1358 (1997) ("As a doctrinal matter, the equal protection holding of Romer
v. Evans[, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),] does not overrule the due process holding of Bowers v.
Hardwick. But the Bowers v. Hardwick that decided all constitutional issues involving lesbi-
ans and gay men is dead.");Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf or, How America
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Evans v. Romer Didn't, 49 DuVE LJ. 1559, 1561
(2000) ("[T]he premises relied upon by the Court in 1986 are no longer valid today.");
Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism,
1996 Sup. CT. REv. 67, 82 ("It is . . . difficult to see how Bowers's validation of same-sex
sodomy laws survives the Court's analysis [in Romer].").
11 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726-27, 752 (1991) (holding that a
capital petitioner had forfeited federal habeas corpus review because his counsel filed the
petitioner's appellate papers in state postconviction proceedings three days late, and re-
jecting the petitioner's attack on the effectiveness of his counsel by stating: "There is no
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purpose of this Article is to expose the Giarratano decision for the chi-
mera that it is.
Part I reviews the Giarratano litigation and several of the questions
that the Supreme Court left unaddressed.
Part II describes the subsequent actions of the states, which are of
considerable legal significance. Notably, every active death penalty
state today, with the exception of Alabama, provides for the prefiling
appointment of counsel to assist indigent death row inmates in the
preparation of postconvictiobn petitions challenging their convictions
and sentences. 12 The remaining Parts discuss legal theories, relying
throughout on the current edition of the ABA Guidelines for the Ap-
pointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases. Because they represent the mainstream views of the legal pro-
fession, 13 ABA standards in the criminal justice field have long been
extremely influential with the Court,14 and this particular document
provides significant empirical support for the arguments that follow.
Part III points out that Giarratano has been seriously overread.
The controlling opinion of Justice Kennedy recognizes that capital
postconviction petitioners have a right to counsel in certain circum-
stances, and those circumstances exist in today's world.
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.... Consequently,
a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceed-
ings."). Coleman is not only "intellectually and practically" untenable but also "morally in-
defensible." Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in AMERICA'S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 553, 568 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT]. Recent DNA testing linking Coleman to the crime
for which he was convicted, see James Dao, DNA Ties Man Executed in '92 to the Murder He
Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A14, does not change this assessment. Coleman may
well have had meritorious postconviction claims not dependent upon factual innocence,
see generally JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY on HAVE MERCY (1997) (comprehensively describing
the case), and in any event this testing should have been done before the execution rather
than years afterward.
12 See infta note 45.
13 The Acknowledgments and Introduction sections to the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases list the numer-
ous experts and institutions that contributed to the Guidelines' formulation. See GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 914-16 (2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
The result of this extended process of consensus building was that the Guidelines arrived
on "the floor of the ABA House of Delegates with the co-sponsorship of a broad spectrum
of ABA entities and passed without a single dissenting vote." Eric M. Freedman, Introduc-
tion, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 903, 912 (2003); see Russell Stetler, Beyond Wiggins: Tipping Points
And Evolving Standards, THE CHAMPION (Wash., D.C.), July 2005, at 49 (noting the impor-
tance of the fact that the Guidelines "reflect the current consensus among practitioners
committed to quality representation").
14 Such "standards [are ones] to which we long have referred as 'guides to determin-
ing what is reasonable'" when considering the performance of defense counsel. Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)); see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. -. _. 125 S. CL 2456, 2466 (2005).
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Part IV focuses on due process issues. Part IV.A argues that the
Giarratano Court should have applied the procedural due process
framework of Mathews v. Eldridge.15 Had it done so, or were it to apply
its more recent analysis of the due process right to counsel in criminal
proceedings, or revive its older analysis based on equal protection, the
constitutional right would be secure. Moreover, Part IV.B argues,
once a state decides to create a statutory entitlement to capital post-
conviction counsel, due process precludes it from arbitrarily divesting
the right by providing ineffective counsel.
Part V discusses the Eighth Amendment and the changes in the
legal and factual environments since Giarratano. These changes show
the case to be inconsistent with contemporary standards of accuracy
with respect to capital determinations.
Part VI considers whether Giarratano would pass muster under
the legal norms applicable to the democracies of Europe and con-
cludes that it would not.
The Article concludes by urging judges, lawyers, and legislators to
recognize that Giarratano is a lifeless husk and calling upon the Su-
preme Court to inter it.
I
FROM GIARRATANO TO GIARRATANO
Giarratano began when Joseph M. Giarratano, a Virginia death
row inmate and remarkable human being, 16 commenced a § 1983 ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia on behalf of himself and his fellow prisoners in which he
asserted their constitutional right to counsel in collateral challenges
to their capital convictions and sentences.1 7 Spurred into action by
15 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16 See Colman McCarthy, Prisoner's Life Is Radically Different from Time of His '79 Convic-
tion, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 26, 2004, at BIl.
17 Giarratano filed the complaint on July 3, 1985. See Complaint and Jurisdiction at 1,
Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986) (Civ. A. No. 85-0655-R) (on file
with author), affd en banc, 847 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 1 (1998). The
filing became official on August 6, 1985, when the judge entered an order permitting
Giarratano to go forward informa pauperis. See Giarratano v. Murray, Civ. A. No. 85-0655-R
(E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 1985) (on file with author). The order required the defendant, the
Director of the Virginia State Department of Corrections, to respond by August 26, and it
granted Giarratano twenty days from receipt of the response to reply. See id.
On August 19, 1985, Giarratano wrote to the assigned district judge, Robert R. Mer-
ighe, Jr., regarding the transfer of one of his co-plaintiffs, Earl Washington, Jr., to another
facility in anticipation of his September 5 execution. See Letter from Joseph M. Giarratano
to Judge Robert R. Merighe, United States District Court (Aug. 19, 1985) (on file with
author). As Giarratano told the judge,
Mr. Washington has all of his State post-conviction remedies open to him:
unfortunately Mr. Washington is mentally incapable of acting in his own
behalf. The Virginia Supreme Court has denied a request to appoint coun-
1082 [Vol. 91:1079
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this development, pro bono lawyers who had been considering op-
tions for systemic attacks on death penalty systems in various jurisdic-
tions decided to advance Giarratano's proposition in the form of a
class action and proceeded to reconfigure his original lawsuit
accordingly. 18
Giarratano's § 1983 case was tried before Judge Mehrige on July
10-11, 1986. He heard extensive testimony from defense lawyers, cap-
ital prisoners, government officials, institutional attorneys designated
to assist death row inmates, as well as from Deans and Giarratano him-
self. The testimony, supplemented by various affidavits, was essentially
undisputed. Postconviction representation was both critical to the in-
mates' cases and legally very complex.19 The government employed
private lawyers on a part-time basis to "assist," but not actually re-
present, Virginia's prisoners, 20 and, in fact, these lawyers had never
sel to assist him in persuing [sic] a petition for state habeas corpus; or to
stay the mandate. Because of his indigency he cannot retain counsel.
Ms. Marie Deans, Director of the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Pris-
ons, has spoken with well over 50 attorneys in hopes that one would assist
on a pro bono basis. To date all of these efforts have failed. The situation as
described above has become common here of late.
Id. at 1. Regarding the schedule set by the court, Giarratano noted, "[iut seems that my co-
plaintiff will be executed before any response by me could be filed; or before any proper
State relief could be sought." Id. On September 5, the court entered an order deeming
this letter to be an amendment to the complaint. See Giarratano v. Murray, Civ. A. No. 85-
0655-R (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 1985) (on file with author).
Meanwhile, Giarratano brought Washington's plight to the attention of Martha Geer,
then a junior associate at the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison, and now a judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See MARGARET EDDS,
AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTONJR. 83-84 (2003). I was a
senior associate at the same firm, and Geer raised the matter with me. As described in Eric
M. Freedman, Earl Washington's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1089, 1099 (2001), 1 thereupon
became part of a legal team that obtained a stay of Washington's execution on August 27,
1985, nine days before it was to occur. See EDDS, supra, at 92; Freedman, supra, at 1110-11.
Sixteen years of further proceedings led to his exoneration on the basis of DNA testing
and, after the intervention of two Governors, resulted in his release on February 12, 2001.
See Freedman, supra, at 1111-12. Washington subsequently filed a civil rights suit against
Virginia officials for fabricating the case against him. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d
274 (4th Cir. 2005); Va. Dep't of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567 (4th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1706 (2005). This suit is ongoing and, along with a number of
co-counsel, I continue to represent him.
Because of my involvement in Washington's case, I frequently consulted with both the
legal team representing the Giarratano class and the one representing Giarratano individu-
ally in his efforts to win relief from his own conviction and death sentence. The Governor
of Virginia subsequently commuted that sentence, see B. Drummond AyresJr., Virginia Gov-
ernor Blocks an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at A16, and I am now assisting counsel
seeking to secure his release on parole.
18 See Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 512; EDDS, supra note 17, at 84-87.
19 See Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
13-18, Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. 511 (Civ. A. 85-0655-R) (on file with author).
20 Lawyers sometimes provided inmates with photocopies of specifically requested
cases, see id. at 44-45, but they could not actually appear as counsel for the inmates, see id.
at 36-38.
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filed a postconviction petition on behalf of a death row inmate, many
of whom had been without representation for long periods.21 Moreo-
ver, the lawyers' 'jurisdiction" did not extend to inmates in the "Death
House," a basement in the Virginia State Penitentiary in which prison-
ers were housed for the fifteen days prior to execution.2 2 Inmates
only had access to full-fledged legal representation if a trial judge, af-
ter reviewing a pro se petition for legal merit, exercised discretion to
appoint counsel. 23 Thus, as the responsible Virginia Attorney General
admitted on the witness stand, if Paul, Weiss had not intervened, the
state would have executed Earl Washington, a mentally retarded man
who could not file a pro se petition. 24 In short, the testimony revealed
that the only actual prefiling representation death row inmates ob-
tained was from volunteer members of the private bar.
This lack of legal representation viewed in light of the complex
and often frenzied legal work required to avert an execution 25 led the
district court to rule that Virginia failed to provide the meaningful
access to the courts that the Constitution requires. 26 Accordingly, the
court ordered the state to provide for the prefiling appointment of
21 See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 9, Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. 511
(Civ. A. No. 85-0655-R) (on file with author).
22 See id. at 10 n.6; Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, supra note 19, at 31.
23 See Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra
note 19, at 36, 49. If the inmate had obtained volunteer counsel to file the petition, the
Government would object to an appointment on the grounds that it was unnecessary. See
id. at 33.
24 See Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra
note 19, at 31-32; Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, supra note 21, at 8 n.5; EDDS,
supra note 17, at 94 (quoting transcript); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Note, Murray v. Giar-
ratano: A Remedy Reduced to a Meaningless Ritual, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 765, 765 n.5 (1990).
25 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 1098 (noting that staying Washington's execution
required a team of Paul, Weiss attorneys to work "a virtually sleepless week" in order to file
"a 1600-page petition for state habeas corpus, along with several applications for ancillary
relief'); see also EDDS, supra note 17, at 89-92 (detailing the Paul, Weiss attorneys' grueling
schedule and rigorous work leading up to the stay in Washington's execution).
26 See Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513-15 (relying on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977)). In its very spare opinion, the district court chose to confine itself to this legal
theory although a number of others had been pressed upon it. See Giarratano v. Murray,
847 F.2d 1118, 1120 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
The Supreme Court plurality later denigrated the factors relied upon by the district
court as unworthy of the status of factual findings. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1989) (plurality opinion). In light of the extensive evidentiary record below, this
treatment was, as the dissent noted, disingenuous at best. See id. at 27 n.19 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The plurality's approach was based upon a concern that if local circumstances
were given weight, "a different constitutional rule [might] apply in a different State if the
district judge hearing that claim reached different conclusions." Id. at 12 (plurality opin-
ion). But the plurality did not explain what would be anomalous about ruling that one
state met its access obligations while another did not.
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counsel for indigent death row inmates desiring to file state habeas
corpus petitions. 27
A divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed the district court's deci-
sion,28 and then in a vote of six to four, the en banc court reinstated
it.29 Relying on the factual record compiled below, the en banc ma-
jority determined that the district court had correctly required the
prefiling appointment of an attorney because "only the continuous
services of an attorney to investigate, research, and present claimed
violations of fundamental rights could provide death row inmates the
meaningful access to the courts guaranteed by the Constitution. 30
The Fourth Circuit's only real hesitation stemmed from the Supreme
Court's recent ruling in Pennsylvania v. Finley' that the Constitution
did not require appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings
to follow the procedures of Anders v. California3 2 if a client's position
lacked merit,33 since the Constitution did not require states to appoint
counsel in such proceedings at all. 34 But in the end, the Fourth Cir-
cuit decided that because Finley was not a case about meaningful ac-
cess to the courts and did not involve the death penalty,3 5 it did not
apply to "the unique circumstances of post-conviction proceedings in-
volving a challenge to the death penalty. '36
Four Supreme Court Justices would have affirmed the en banc
ruling of the Fourth Circuit because "Virginia's procedure for collat-
eral review of capital convictions and sentences [does not assure] its
indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly."37 But Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality
consisting of himself and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia, con-
cluded that "the rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differ-
ently in capital cases than in noncapital cases."38 Rather, any need for
additional safeguards in capital cases should be met through the
Eighth Amendment's rules governing the trial phase of such cases.39
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only and wrote sepa-
rately that
27 Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 517.
28 See Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1428 (4th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 847 F.2d
1118 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
29 See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1119.
30 Id. at 1120.
31 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
32 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
3 See Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
34 See id.
35 See Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1122.
36 Id.
37 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 32 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
38 Id. at 10 (plurality opinion).
39 See id.
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It] he requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various
ways .... While Virginia has not adopted procedures for securing
representation that are as far reaching and effective as those availa-
ble in other States, no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been
unable to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction pro-
ceedings, and Virginia's prison system is staffed with institutional
lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for postconviction relief. I
am not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.
On the facts and record of this case, I concur in the judgment
of the Court.4 0
Justice O'Connor joined justice Kennedy's opinion, as well as that of
the plurality, writing separately that she did not view the two as
inconsistent. 41
Thus, the Court's judgment turned on Justice Kennedy's conclu-
sion that "on the facts and record of this case"4 2 Virginia had met its
constitutional duty. To read Giarratano as holding that states have no
obligation to provide postconviction counsel to death row inmates is
to misread it. On the contrary, five, and perhaps six, Justices plainly
believed that states do have such an obligation.
II
THE AFTIERMATH OF GIARRATANO
Giarratano was not received well. The scholarly community con-
demned it4 3 and the states responded uneasily. At the time of the
decision only eighteen of the thirty-seven states with the death penalty
automatically appointed defense counsel in capital postconviction
proceedings. 44 Today, thirty-three of the thirty-seven death penalty
states do so. 45 On the other hand, only fourteen of those thirty-three
40 Id. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43 See, e.g., Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV.
557, 606 (1994) (describing the plurality's view as "the short-weighing of fundamental con-
stitutional rights so as to skew the scales of criminal justice and cheapen the value of
human life"); Moohr, supra note 24 (concluding that the Court erred); Scott Elliott Rog-
ers, Note, Limiting the Relief Available to Indigent Death Row Inmates Denied Meaningful Access to
the Courts: Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989), 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 399, 399
(1990) (concluding that "the decision is supported by neither precedent nor policy"); see
also Michael A. Mello, Is There A Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel in Capital Post-Convic-
tion Proceedings?, 79J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1067 (1989) (arguing that the Court
should rule in Giarratano's favor).
44 Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10 n.5 (plurality opinion).
45 SeeARiz. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(a) (1) (A) (i) (2006); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-12-205(1) (2004); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-296 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.702 (West Supp. 2006); IDAHO CRIM.
R. 44.2; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-1-
2(a) (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4506(d)(1)(C)(2) (Supp. 2004); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31.110(2)(c) (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:149.1 (2005); MD. CODE
1086 [Vol. 91:1079
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states recognize a state statutory or constitutional right to have the
appointed counsel be effective. 46 Moreover, even when made, decla-
rations of rights that "sound so fair"147 often consist of pronounce-
ments " [t] hat palter with us in a double sense; [t] hat keep the word of
promise to our ear, [a]nd break it to our hope."48 In actuality, "the
intertwined realities of chronic underfunding, lack of standards, and a
dearth of qualified lawyers willing to accept appointment have re-
ANN. CIM. PROC. § 7-108(a) (LexisNexis 2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-23(9) (West
Supp. 2005); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 24.036(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-201(3)(b)(i) (2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-3402(1) (LexisNexis 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-34.820
(LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
16-3 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 7A-451(c) (LexisNexis 2005); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2953.21(I)(1) (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355.6 (West
2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.590 (2003); PA. R. C~iM. P. 904(G) (1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-
160(B) (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-27-4 (1987); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13(d)(1)(D);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071(2) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-35a-202(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (LexisNexis 2004);
WASH. R. ApP. P. 16.25; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-104(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).
46 See Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889, 894-95 (Alaska 2003) (holding that the due pro-
cess clause of Alaska's constitution requires effective postconviction counsel); Lozada v.
Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821-22 (Conn. 1992) (holding that the statutory right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings includes the right to effective assistance of counsel); Her-
nandez v. State, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (holding the ineffectiveness of a
lawyer representing the defendant in a prior action for postconviction relief to be a suffi-
cient reason to permit the defendant to pursue a second petition for relief); In re Carmody,
653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings includes the right to effective assistance of counsel); Daniels v.
State, 741 N.E.2d 1177, 1189-91 (Ind. 2001) (recognizing a limited right to effective assis-
tance of postconviction counsel); Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa 1994) (re-
considering the right to effective assistance of counsel after the U.S. Supreme Court held
that no such federal constitutional right exists, and holding that the statutory right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel remains good law because it is not grounded in the Federal Con-
stitution); Brown v. State, 101 P.3d 1201, 1203-04 (Kan. 2004) (holding that the statutory
right to counsel in postconviction proceedings includes the right to effective assistance of
counsel); Stovall v. State, 800 A.2d 31, 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (same); Jackson v.
State, 98-DR-00708-SCT ( 11-12), 732 So. 2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (en banc) (holding
that the state constitution mandates the assignment of counsel in capital postconviction
proceedings, and urging further legislative action to remedy the inability of death row
inmates to acquire counsel); Crump v. Warden, 934 P.2d 247, 252-53 (Nev. 1997) (hold-
ing that a petitioner who had postconviction counsel appointed by statutory mandate was
entitled to effective assistance by such counsel); State v. Velez, 746 A.2d 1073, 1076-77
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that the state's rule mandating the assignment of
counsel for postconviction proceedings creates an entitlement to effective assistance of
counsel); Hale v. State, 934 P.2d 1100, 1102-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (inferring a re-
quirement of effectiveness from statutory mandate for appointment); Commonwealth v.
Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 303 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the ineffectiveness of postconviction
counsel provides a basis for relief because effectiveness is implicit in the enforceable right
to postconviction relief);Jackson v. Weber, 2001 SD 136 12-19, 637 N.W.2d 19, 22-24
(holding that the statutory right to counsel in postconviction proceedings includes the
right to effective assistance of such counsel).
47 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 1, sc. 3.
48 Id. act 5, sc. 8.
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sulted in a disturbingly large number of instances in which attorneys
have failed to provide their clients meaningful assistance. '49
One need not look far for evidence of the rampant ineffective-
ness of postconviction capital counsel at the state level. Current law
provides significant procedural advantages in capital federal habeas
corpus proceedings to states that have mechanisms for providing
"competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by
indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been
upheld on direct appeal. '50 Many states have sought to gain these
benefits. Not one has succeeded.51
49 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 932 n.47 (internal citations omitted). For an overview
of the landscape, see Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-
Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 347, 353-80 (2003).
See generally Sarah L. Thomas, Comment, A Legislative Challenge: A Proposed Model Statute to
Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent Petitioners,
64 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1167 (2005) (urging state legislatures not to "passively stand by and
wait for their state courts or the U.S. Supreme Court to take action ... [but instead to]
utilize their resources to implement a statutory right to counsel for indigent habeas corpus
petitioners").
50 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2000). Any state that creates such a program "opts in" to
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See
John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259, 271 (2006). For
a summary of the advantages to states that opt in, see id. at 272 and GUIDELINES, supra note
13, at 931 n.40.
51 See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the state's failure
to comply with Arizona's facially sufficient Chapter 154 mechanism prevented it from ben-
efiting from the opt-in provisions); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Missouri does not qualify under Chapter 154); Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d
276, 285-87 (4th Cir. 2000) (same, as to Maryland); Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 604-05
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that South Carolina's "mere promulgation of a 'mechanism'
[was] not sufficient to permit [it] to invoke [Chapter 154's] provisions .... [T]hose mech-
anisms and standards must in fact be complied with . .. ."); Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d
1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that California failed to meet the opt-in requirements
of Chapter 154); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1997) (same, as to
Texas); Brown v. Puckett, No. 3:01CV197-D, 2003 WL 21018627, at *2-3 (N.D. Miss. Mar.
12, 2003) (same, as to Mississippi); Kasi v. Angelone, 200 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592-93 n.2 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (same, as to Virginia); Smith v. Anderson, 104 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (same, as to Ohio); Ward v. French, 989 F. Supp. 752, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (same, as
to North Carolina), affd, 165 F.3d 22 (4th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088,
1092 (W.D. La. 1996) (same, as to Louisiana), affjd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 125
F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997); Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (same,
as to Tennessee); Ryan v. Hopkins, No. 4:CV95-3391, 1996 WL 539220, at *3-4 (D. Neb.
1996) (concluding that Nebraska's framework for appointing counsel in postconviction
capital cases was not in compliance with subsections (b) and (c) of § 2261).
To the extent that the states do bring about competent representation, the need for a
judicially enforceable right under the Federal Constitution will diminish, cf. supra note 8
(noting increased state protections for homosexual activity prior to Lawrence), although
the likelihood that courts will acknowledge one will increase, see infra note 81.
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III
RE-VIEWING GARRATANO
Contrary to much loose talk, Giarratano did not decide that there
is no right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings in capital
cases. 52 Rather, Giarratano only rejected the claim of constitutional
entitlement in that particular instance, and implicitly held that other
facts would lead to other results.5 3 As indicated above, the controlling
vote belonged to Justice Kennedy, who emphasized that his concur-
rence was based "[o]n the facts and record of this case," in which "no
prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel
to represent him in postconviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison
system is staffed with institutional lawyers to assist in preparing peti-
tions for postconviction relief. '54
The perverse implication of this statement is that by acting to save
Earl Washington's life, the Paul, Weiss lawyers actually reduced their
chances of prevailing in Giarratano. If Virginia had in fact executed
Mr. Washington-as the assistant attorney general testified would
have happened if a petition for postconviction relief had not been
filed 55 -perhaps Justice Kennedy would have been satisfied that a Vir-
ginia prisoner had actually been denied counsel. But this scenario
would have been as unsatisfactory to the criminal justice system as it
would have been contrary to professional ethics and basic morality. A
state would have executed an innocent person who had falsely con-
fessed long before anyone could establish his innocence-an outcome
that would both have been grievously unjust to the individual and
have buried the very knowledge necessary to make reforms to the sys-
tem. Moreover, it is wrong in principle to excuse a state from meeting
a constitutional obligation because a private party voluntarily stepped
in to fulfill the state's duty.56
Regardless of the merits of Justice Kennedy's view of the facts of
Giarratano, some state systems today are considerably worse than that
of Virginia in the 1980s. The current leading example is Alabama,
which has no system at all for providing prefiling assistance 5 7 to capi-
52 See supra Part I.
53 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 40.
55 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
56 See Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systemically: Governments' Respon-
sibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1097, 1101 n.13 (2003); cf Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938)
(holding that a state cannot not discharge its duty to provide an integrated law school by
sending the plaintiff to one elsewhere).
57 As in Giarratano, a court, in its discretion, may provide counsel after examining the
petition for potential merit. The Dallas and Barbour cases cited infra note 64 are examples
of this system at work-and of its inadequacies.
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tal prisoners wishing to pursue postconviction actions, 58 known locally
as Rule 32 proceedings. 59 Accordingly, Alabama prisoners are at the
mercy of whatever pro bono assistance they can scrape together and
their own pro se efforts. 60
In today's legal environment the effect of this system is that some
prisoners may literally be left to die of neglect. Under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a petitioner
must exhaust all state postconviction remedies before seeking federal
habeas corpus review. 61 But, except in the rarest of circumstances, a
petitioner has only one year after the denial of certiorari on direct
appeal to file a federal habeas corpus petition (a period that is tolled
while a properly filed postconviction review petition is pending in the
state courts ).62 Thus, if ten months elapse between the denial of certi-
orari and the filing of a state postconviction petition, the prisoner will
have two months after that petition is finally denied to file for federal
habeas corpus relief. If, however, thirteen months elapse before the
state filing, even if the petition is still timely under state law, after it is
denied the inmate will be precluded from any federal court review at
all-and some Texas prisoners have been executed under those very
circumstances. 63
In a number of reported cases, unrepresented Alabama prisoners
forfeited their Rule 32 rights, and only last moment intervention by
the federal courts prevented the state from executing them with their
federal claims unreviewed. 64 Unless the meaning ofJustice Kennedy's
58 See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 932 n.47, 1081 n.333 (singling out Alabama as
engaging in "irresponsible behavior" and encouraging defense counsel to argue that the
state must comply with Giarratano). Georgia presently ranks second on this "dishonor
roll." Its thoroughly inadequate system for the appointment of counsel in postconviction
capital proceedings was one of the reasons that the ABA, in an exhaustive report, called for
a moratorium on executions in that state. See AMERiCAN BAR AsSOCIATIoN, EVALUATING
FAIRNESS AND AccuRAcY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY
ASSESSMENT REPORT, at iii, 13, 147-52 (2006) (finding that the Georgia capital postconvic-
tion system is in "a situation where this critical constitutional safeguard is so undermined as
to be ineffective"), available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/
georgia/finalreport.doc.
59 See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.
60 See Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Plaintiffs' Submission of Additional Rule 56(e) Materials at 3-9, Barbour v. Haley, 410
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (Civ. A. No. 01-S-1530-N) (on file with author).
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (A) (2000); cf. infra note 79 (discussing an exception to
this requirement).
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000).
63 See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1085 n.347 and accompanying text.
64 See Dallas v. Haley, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (staying execution two
days before it was to occur for an inmate who had been appointed counsel by the court
after he filed a Rule 32 petition but whose appeal from the dismissal of that petition had
been dismissed as untimely); Barbour v. Haley, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(staying execution two days before it was to occur for an inmate who had been appointed
counsel by the court after filing of a Rule 32 petition but whose counsel withdrew before
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controlling opinion really is that one prisoner must be executed
before other prisoners can successfully claim that denying them law-
yers to prepare capital postconviction petitions is unconstitutional, the
Alabama system-which has been aptly described as "legal Russian
roulette"65-violates the Constitution even under Giarratano's exigu-
ous standard.
Before devising new legal theories, courts and lawyers should take
the simple step of reading the case accurately and applying it to the
facts presented to them.
IV
RE-VIEWING DUE PROCESS
A. Protecting Liberty
In considering Giarratano's argument that he had a due process
right to counsel for postconviction proceedings, the plurality stated
the claim as one for a "right of access" to the legal system under
Bounds v. Smith.66 But the plurality's opinion left two major gaps.
First, it contained no discussion of equal protection doctrine,
even though this had been the basis for some of the precedents un-
derlying Bounds, including most notably Douglas v. California.67 Al-
though those underpinnings were of little interest to the Court when
it decided Giarratano, it has recently reiterated their importance in
considering judicial access claims. 68 In view of the plurality's neglect
of this issue, it would pose no great challenge to construct an argu-
dismissal of that petition with the result that no appeal from that dismissal was ever filed);
Arthur v. Haley, No. CV-01-N-00983-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2001) (order granting a stay of
execution two days before the scheduled execution of an inmate who had been unrepre-
sented for more than two years following his direct appeal) (on file with author).
65 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1081 n.333.
66 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Giar-
ratano's argument that his "tight of access" to the courts under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977), was violated). The dissent rejected this narrow focus:
Far from creating a discrete constitutional right, Bounds constitutes one
part of a jurisprudence that encompasses "right-to-counsel" as well as "ac-
cess-to-courts" cases. Although each case is shaped by its facts, all share a
concern, based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, that accused and con-
victed persons be permitted to seek legal remedies without arbitrary gov-
ernmental interference.
Id. at 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, in some proceedings due process may
require the provision of a lawyer regardless of any issue of access to the courts. But the
dissent did not discuss the various other constitutional theories invoked. See id at 15 n.1.
The plurality treated Giarratano's claim of a need for special accuracy in his particular
circumstances as arising under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 8-10 (plurality opinion).
Accordingly, I will address it under that heading. See infra Part V.
67 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
68 See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 110-13, 120-21 (1996) (holding that the state of
Mississippi had to provide a free trial transcript to an indigent mother to enable her to
appeal the loss of her parental rights).
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ment that its decision was incorrect or, alternatively, that the Court
must reach the opposite result today under this newly reinvigorated
theory.69
Second, the Giarratano plurality failed to discuss Mathews v. El-
dridge.70 This gap too is a sufficient reason to characterize Giarratano
as having been wrongly decided. 71 As the Court recently reiterated in
a context presenting "weighty and sensitive governmental interests '7 2
that militated against the procedural safeguards sought by the pris-
oner, the "ordinary" test for deciding such a claim "is the test we ar-
ticulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."73
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is deter-
mined by weighing "the private interest that will be affected by the
official action" against the Government's asserted interest, "includ-
ing the function involved" and the burdens the Government would
face in providing greater process. The Mathews calculus then con-
templates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an anal-
ysis of "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" of the private interest
if the process were reduced and the "probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards." 74
If the Court had applied the Mathews test in Giarratano, the death
row inmates would have won. On the individual side of the Mathews
calculus, physical liberty is "the most elemental of liberty interests"
69 See Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death Row: M.L.B. and the Indigent's Right
to Counsel at Capital State Postconviction Proceedings, 107 YALE L.J. 2211, 2246 (1998) (arguing
that in light of M.L.B. the "right of access to the criminal process should be used to over-
rule Giarratano on equal protection grounds and to provide counsel for indigent death row...
inmates at state postconviction proceedings").
70 424 U.S. 319 (1976); cf. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Mathews without discussion).
71 Alternatively, this gap, like the failure to discuss the equal protection doctrine,
could provide a basis for a later Court to distinguish Giarratano away. Were it to rule in this
fashion the Court would be employing a well-established technique. See, e.g., Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (using the First Amendment to substantially
overrule the result in Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), which had been based
on the Sixth Amendment); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (using
due process to substantially overrule the result in Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), which had been based on equal protection); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
533-34 (1975) (using the Sixth Amendment to overrule the result in Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961), which had been based on due process and equal protection).
72 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 531 (2004) (plurality opinion) (deciding
what process is due in making the determination that an individual may be detained as an
"enemy combatant"). The main opinion was written by justice O'Connor for a four-mem-
ber plurality. In a concurring opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Souter stated
that he would have decided the case in favor of the petitioner on other grounds, and, had
he reached the due process issue, would have provided more robust procedural rights than
the plurality did. See id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., concurring). I note that I was a member of
Hamdi's legal team.
73 Id. at 528-29.
74 Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
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safeguarded by due process. 75 Furthermore, protecting against its un-
just deprivation through a wrongful execution is not just a private in-
terest of the prisoner. All actors in the criminal justice system-
prosecutors, judges, and victims no less than defendants-share an
interest in the accuracy of the decision to put a person to death by
state authority.76
In terms of the governmental burden, requiring the states to pro-
vide competent postconviction lawyers in capital cases will certainly
impose new costs on them. But those costs already exist. They are just
being borne by others: by death row inmates in injustice,7 7 by pro
bono counsel in dollars, 78 and by the federal government, which pays
habeas counsel to attempt to clean up the messes that ineffective state
postconviction lawyers leave behind. 79
75 Id. Accordingly, the Court has recognized the applicability of due process stan-
dards in this area without consideration of the extent to which the liberty interest is recog-
nized as such by state law. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977)
(applying due process analysis to the paddling of schoolchildren).
76 See Eric M. Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines and the Duties of Lawyers and Judges
in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 5 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESs 325, 332 (2003) (quoting
Comm. on Civ. Rts., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Legislative Modification of Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REc. OF ASS'N OF BAR OF N.Y. 848, 854 (1989)).
77 See Freedman, supra note 56, at 1101.
78 See id.
79 Federal law provides for the appointment of qualified counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings challenging state capital convictions. See 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 8(q) (4) (B) (2000); Mc-
Farland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (noting the importance of this entitlement "in
promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death penalty"). Of course, one
of the key duties of such counsel is to attempt to overcome any procedural blunders com-
mitted by state postconviction attorneys. See Freedman, supra note 76, at 341-42. Hence,
notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of
counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a
ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254."), if appointed federal
habeas counsel fails to perform competently a petitioner may be able to assert rights flow-
ing from the statutory mandate for qualified counsel. See Cooey v. Bradshaw, 216 F.R.D.
408, 415-17 (N.D. Ohio) (granting stay of execution on a claim of ineffective assistance by
prior counsel appointed under § 848), motion to vacate stay denied, 338 F.3d 615 (6th Cir.),
motion to vacate stay denied, 539 U.S. 974 (2003).
Moreover, to the extent that state postconviction remedies are "ineffective to protect
the rights of the applicant"-for example, because without competent counsel the pris-
oner cannot effectively use those proceedings to assert his federal ights-such remedies
need not be exhausted as a predicate to federal habeas corpus review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1) (B) (ii) (2000). This provision, which dates back to 1966, was left unamended
by AEDPA and is thus unaffected by its Chapter 154. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text (describing Chapter 154). In any event, a state postconviction process might be inef-
fective to protect the rights of the applicant even if it does provide for the appointment of
counsel. Such a claim is currently being litigated with respect to Mississippi's capital post-
conviction system. See Reply to Respondents' Overall Assertions that Grounds C, D, and E
of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted at
5-49, Grayson v. Epps, No. 1:04CV708-B (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1, 2005) (on file with author).
Thus, the federal government is bearing significant costs that the states would bear if
they were providing competent counsel to capital postconviction petitioners. From a Ma-
thews perspective, it is questionable whether requiring the states to do so would impose any
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The virtually unanimous decision of the death penalty states to
provide lawyers for capital postconviction proceedings8 ° amply testi-
fies to the fact that the assistance of counsel is critical in making those
proceedings meaningful. 8 1 Indeed, the Court may not even be enti-
tled under its own recent precedents to weigh and balance the factors
of the Mathews calculus. The premise of Giarratano was that state post-
conviction proceedings are collateral attacks on convictions and fall
into an entirely different constitutional category than direct appeals. 82
But the Court's recent jurisprudence draws a different line. It decides
whether particular criminal proceedings carry a due process right to
the appointment of counsel by distinguishing proceedings that prima-
rily correct error in individual cases from ones that declare legal prin-
ciples concerning issues of general public importance. 83 Since capital
postconviction proceedings plainly fall into the former class, they may
well carry a mandatory due process right to counsel. And where there
additional costs on the government as a whole. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Perhaps recognizing that effective assistance of postconviction counsel in capital cases
is in the interests of the federal government as well as of the states, Congress has recently
taken the first steps toward providing funding to bring it about. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14163
(West 2005). See also Lily Henning, The White House's Capital Venture, LEGAL TIMES (Wash.,
D.C.), Mar. 21, 2005, at 1 (discussing President George W. Bush's support for such funding
in his State of the Union Message on Feb. 2, 2005).
Viewing the matter through a slightly different due process lens, Congress could sim-
ply act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to mandate that the states fulfill
their obligations. See Moohr, supra note 24, at 809 (making this proposal).
80 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81 Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985) (collecting state statutes that make
expert psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants as support for the holding
that due process requires the provision of such assistance).
82 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). For an early attack on this premise,
see Moohr, supra note 24, at 791. This explains why the Sixth Amendment is the dog that
failed to bark throughout the case. But as subsequently became clear, the effect of this
silence was to leave unanswered whether there might be a Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive postconviction counsel when, as is frequently the case, postconviction proceedings are
the first opportunity to assert the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See Mackall v. Angelone,
131 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (addressing this argument); id. at 451-52
(Butzner, J., dissenting) (same). The silence has become louder in the wake of Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09 (2003) (holding unanimously that federal prisoners do
not have to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, but rather
can wait and raise them during postconviction proceedings). See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffec-
tive Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v.
United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 799-801 (2004) (arguing that Massaro "casts serious
doubt on" Giarratano).
83 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. (2005); 125 S. Ct. 2582, 2586,
2590 (2005) (holding that a defendant who had pleaded guilty was entitled to the appoint-
ment of counsel in preparing leave to appeal because in passing on such applications ap-
peals courts look to the merits of the individual case and because indigent defendants
pursuing such review "are generally ill equipped to represent themselves").
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is a due process right to counsel there is the right to effective
counsel. 84
B. Protecting Statutory Entitlements
The same due process conclusion follows if the matter is consid-
ered from the viewpoint not of liberty, which states are not free to
grant or withhold, but of property in the form of statutory entitle-
ments. Even if states are not required to grant the right to postconvic-
tion counsel in the first place, once they do the state-created
entitlement may not be arbitrarily denied.8 5 As Professor McConville
has amply demonstrated, the Constitution compels states that have
created a state statutory right to capital postconviction counsel to pro-
vide effective counsel.8 6
V
RE-VIEWING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Even if the Court is unprepared to hold that ordinary principles
of due process now require the states to provide counsel in capital
postconviction proceedings, it could quite comfortably reach that re-
sult under the Eighth Amendment.87
84 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 239, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ap-
plying the Mathews factors to hold that a class of mothers facing the termination of their
parental rights had a due process right to the appointment of counsel and for such counsel
to be effective).
85 See, e.g., Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 488-489 (1980)); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
86 See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postcon-
viction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counse4 2003 Wis. L.
REV. 31, 67-68; Letty S. Di Giulio, Note, Dying for the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in
State Post-Conviction Proceedings: State Statutes & Due Process in Capital Cases, 9 B.U. PuB. INT.
L.J. 109, 129-31 (1999) (presenting an initial version of the theory); see also Megan K.
Rosichan, Comment, A Meaningless Ritual? The Due Process Mandate for the Provision of Compe-
tent Counsel in Arkansas Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 749, 751-52
(2004) (arguing that Arkansas' failure to provide effective assistance of postconviction
counsel appointed pursuant to a state statute may create federal and state claims for "dep-
ivation of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
Indeed, this was precisely the reasoning of the Alaska Supreme Court in Grinols v.
State, 74 P.3d 889, 894-95 (Alaska 2003). Although the Alaska Supreme Court is not one
that has interpreted its state's statutory entitlement to counsel to include an entitlement to
effective counsel, see supra note 46 (listing those courts), it read the due process clause of
its constitution, which it gave the same meaning as Mathews, to require that result. See
Grinols, 74 P.3d at 894-95.
87 Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Court had invalidated under
the Eighth Amendment capital sentencing procedures that it had upheld against a due
process challenge in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)).
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The unique imperative of safeguards to ensure accuracy in crimi-
nal prosecutions that might eventuate in the prisoner's execution is
deeply woven into centuries of jurisprudence in England,88 in the
states,89 and in the Supreme Court of the United States. 90 In approv-
ing the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976, the Court made
clear that because the death penalty is qualitatively different from any
other punishment, the Eighth Amendment requires heightened pro-
cedural safeguards to ensure accuracy and reliability in its administra-
tion.91 The Court has adhered to that position ever since,92 and has
relied upon the "acute need for reliability in capital sentencing pro-
ceedings" in declining to extend those safeguards to noncapital
cases.
93
The undeniable reality that litigating death penalty cases is infi-
nitely more complicated than other criminal cases94 has only grown
more stark as a result of legal developments since Giarratano. The fun-
damental Eighth Amendment mandate of reliability in capital pro-
ceedings is simply not achievable unless a defendant has the assistance
of counsel in state postconviction proceedings. To the extent that
Giarratano was based on the contrary premise, 95 it has become obso-
88 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *338, *352-57 (describing respects in
which, infavorem vitae, the laws of England were more favorable to capital than noncapital
prisoners and arguing for legislative intervention when they were not).
89 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 115 S.E. 326, 335 (S.C. 1922); Bearden v. State, 44 Ark.
331, 334 (1884); Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103, 104-05 (1851).
90 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S.
375, 391 (1955); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
91 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)
("Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.").
92 See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 & n.13 (1980);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (plurality opinion).
93 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732, 733-34 (1998) (holding that the double
jeopardy protection detailed in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), only applies to
capital cases).
94 See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855-56 (1994); see also GUIDELINES, supra note
13, at 923 (discussing the "uniquely demanding" nature of the responsibilities of defense
counsel in capital cases).
95 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("The additional
safeguards imposed by the Eighth Amendment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we
think, sufficient to assure the reliability of the process by which the death penalty is im-
posed."). Even when first presented, this optimistic view ignored the fact that the Court's
approval of the "death qualification" of capital juries in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986), had validated the "jarring injustice" that capital cases "are tried under rules that
systematically increase the chances that the innocent will be convicted compared to the
trial of the same case where the death penalty is not sought." Eric M. Freedman, Mend It or
End It?: The Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines as an Opportunity to Recon-
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lete. 96 The legal and factual environments are both very different
than they were in 1989, and there is ample precedent for the Court to
overrule its death penalty decisions in light of evolving realities.
97
In the years after Giarratano, the Court decided a series of cases
that precluded petitioners from achieving review of the constitutional
merits of their claims through federal habeas corpus. 98 For example,
the Court's decisions made it vanishingly rare for death row inmates
to overcome such defenses as procedural default,9 9 abuse of the
writ,'00 and nonexhaustion,1 0 1 while also creating a nonretroactivity
doctrine that radically shrank the universe of claims on which a fed-
eral habeas court could grant relief.10 2 Even with these obstacles to
the recognition and correction of error in place, the realities of the
unreliability of the system kept breaching the levees that hid them.
The most comprehensive available data shows that 68% of death
sentences did not survive postconviction review. Approximately 47%
were reversed at the state level (41% on direct appeal and 6% on state
collateral attack), and a further 21% on federal habeas corpus re-
sider the Death Penalty, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 663, 667-68 (2005); see GUIDELINES, supra note
13, at 1052 & n.261; Marla Sandys & Scott McClelland, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death:
The Failure of Death Qualification to Ensure Impartiality, in AMERCA'S EXPERIMENT, supra note
11, at 385, 408 (providing a comprehensive review of the social science literature showing
that death-qualified jurors "are more conviction-prone, less concerned with due process,
and.., more inclined to believe the prosecution," and as a result of the death-qualification
process itself, "often are unwilling or unable to consider mitigation evidence").
96 The lower courts should take note of the current legal environment and not follow
outdated precedent. Cf Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D.
W. Va. 1942) (refusing to follow Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), on
the basis that the Court would no longer adhere to it), affd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); State ex
rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (concluding that
the Court would no longer adhere to Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)), affd, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
97 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that the Constitution bars the execution of
convicts younger than eighteen at the time of their crimes, thus overruling Stanford, 492
U.S. at 378); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608-09 (2002) (holding that the Constitution
ordinarily requires jury determination of factors making the defendant death-eligible,
overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-51 (1990)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Constitution forbids the execution of mentally retarded
individuals, abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989)). In Roper and Atkins,
the Court relied heavily upon the fact that since its prior ruling there had been steady
movement on the state level toward its new position. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60 (quoting
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
314-15. There has been an even stronger trend on the state level toward the appointment
of capital postconviction counsel than was evident in either of those two cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 43-45.
98 See Freedman, supra note 11, at 563-68.
99 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991).
IOO See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488-89 (1991).
101 See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
102 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-10 (1989).
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view103 (after first running the gauntlet of state postconviction
proceedings).
The passage of AEDPA in 1996 then rearranged the legal land-
scape of capital litigation in such a way as to increase the importance
of state postconviction proceedings even further.1 0 4 By limiting fed-
eral habeas corpus review of the factual and legal determinations of
state courts, 10 5 AEDPA sought to give state courts the last word on
questions of both guilt and sentence-and the last word on the state
level is spoken during the postconviction process. 10 6
The factual and legal implications of these developments are far-
reaching' 0 7 and cast a harsh light on the hollowness of Giarratano.'0 8
Factually, the problem of innocent people being condemned to
death is far more salient than it was in the 1980s.10 9 Moreover, there
103 See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 932 n.46 (citing JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BRO-
KEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 app. A at 5-7 (2000)). The statis-
tics from this comprehensive empirical study by Professor Liebman and his colleagues have
been distilled in James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839, 1847, 1850 & n.37 (2000). For a full discussion, see
Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in
the United States, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004).
104 Last term, in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005), the Court quite
appropriately relaxed the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), in light of its recogni-
tion that "[t]he enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the landscape for fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions." Rhines, 544 U.S. at _, 125 S. Ct. at 1533.
105 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)-(e) (1996) (providing that a federal court may not grant
the writ unless state proceedings resulted in a decision that "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" or "was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding").
106 This might be of less concern if states systematically provided effective assistance of
counsel at capital trials, see Freedman, supra note 17, at 1106, but states do not, see GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 13, at 928-30; Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant's Right to
Competent Counsel: It's Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 129 (2005). See generally
Nelson v. Washington, No. 04-35383, 2006 WL 529958, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006) (un-
published memorandum) (granting a federal habeas petitioner relief for ineffectiveness of
trial counsel because, inter alia, state court factfinding was flawed by appointment of post-
conviction lawyer laboring under a conflict of interest); Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon 's
Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 955, 962 (2004) (arguing that the only way for the Court to
ensure effective trial representation is to provide petitioners with effective postconviction
counsel to challenge the adequacy of the petitioners' trial representation).
107 Indeed, they go beyond the particular issue of postconviction counsel that this Arti-
cle addresses. The greater the extent to which the final available route for petitioners to
vindicate their federal rights is through the state courts, the greater the constitutional obli-
gation of those courts to have in place effectual mechanisms for the enforcement of those
rights. See Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas
Reform, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 633, 663-64 (2002).
108 See Hammel, supra note 49, at 349 (observing that AEDPA and other recent legal
changes "place an incalculable premium on competent representation by talented, ade-
quately funded lawyers" in capital postconviction proceedings).
109 The Web site of the Death Penalty Information Center lists 123 cases of people who
have been released from death row on account of evidence of their innocence since 1973.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row, http://
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is an increasing recognition that for many reasons, including the natu-
ral evolution of scientific techniques, exculpatory evidence tends to
emerge at a relatively late stage in capital cases. 1 0 In today's legal
environment, the last stage at which the emergence of such evidence
can realistically do the prisoner any good is during state postconvic-
tion proceedings,1  since to date there is only dictum from the Court
supporting the proposition that an inmate asserts a violation of the
Constitution by alleging in a federal habeas corpus petition that a
state is about to execute an innocent person.' 12 Although the embar-
rassing saga of Paul Gregory House may lead to a more favorable legal
rule, 113 even the strongest ruling in House's favor will simply high-
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?acid=6&did=110 (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). Only
thirty-six of these releases took place before 1989, and the average number of exonerations
per year has risen sharply since then. Id.
For a comprehensive empirical overview of the problem presented as part of a sympo-
sium on innocence in capital cases, see Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States 1989 Through 2003, 95J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005); Michael L. Radelet &
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at
325. Significantly, the term "innocent" in the postconviction context has a far more strin-
gent definition than at trial. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M.
Freedman as the Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22,
2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 403, 411 (2004) (observing that an innocent person seeking
postconviction relief"must demonstrate to judges both that his or her constitutional rights
were violated in the criminal process and that he or she is really not guilty by a standard
that can only be described as the squeaky clean test").
1o See Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Juy: Two Legislative Pro-
posals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 315, 316 (1991). This emerging understanding strongly suggests that the
Supreme Court should overrule the suggestion of Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174
(1988) (plurality opinion), that there is no constitutional right to have the jury in a capital
trial consider "lingering doubts" about the defendant's guilt as a mitigating factor in sen-
tencing. Id.; accord GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1060 n.275 (listing reasons why there is
ample support for doubting the force of this precedent). In its recent decision in Oregon v.
Guzek, the Court specifically declined to reach the issue. See 546 U.S ... __ 126 S. Ct.
1226, 1232 (2006).
I11 See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 932-35 (discussing the importance of state post-
conviction proceedings in vindicating claims of innocence).
112 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (holding that Herrera had not
made a strong enough initial showing of his innocence to be entitled to pursue whatever
putative constitutional claim might exist); Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Inno-
cence: The Legacy ofHerrera v. Collins, 42 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 121 (2005) (presenting a sharp
critique of the case). The gravity of the issue has been highlighted by the subsequent chil-
ling revelation that an innocent defendant was actually executed in Texas in 1993. See Lise
Olsen, Cantu Case: Death and Doubt, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 21, 2005, at Al.
113 See House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
2991 (2005). Eightjudges in that case found that although House had presented "a color-
able claim of actual innocence," he was entitled to no relief under existing law. Id. at 684.
One judge concluded that since there was grave doubt as to House's guilt, he should re-
ceive a new trial. See id. at 709-10 (Gilman, J., dissenting). Six judges ruled that because
House had established his actual innocence, see id. at 686 (Merritt, J., dissenting), he had
met the criteria hypothesized by the dictum in Herrera and was entitled to immediate re-
lease. See id. at 708. With House heading for execution on this 8-7 vote, and the law de-
scending ever deeper into its unsettling habit of hiding factual errors behind a "veil of
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light, not diminish, the need for competent counsel in state capital
postconviction proceedings, because innocent death row inmates in
the future will still have to thread the AEDPA labyrinth." 4 Further-
more, as a matter of federalism, habeas corpus ought to provide only a
fallback for innocent defendants who have somehow made it to that
point, not their primary protection.
Legally, the Court has increasingly come to understand the im-
portance of competent representation at the penalty phase of capital
cases. In three death penalty cases since 2000, the only cases of any
kind since 1984 in which it has ever found ineffective assistance of
counsel, 115 the Court ruled that counsel performed incompetently
during the sentencing phase by failing to unearth and present mitigat-
ing evidence. 116 Having been thoroughly persuaded of the impor-
tance of effective advocacy at the penalty phase, the Court was willing
in those cases to find that the petitioners had made the necessary
demonstrations of ineffective assistance of counsel to prevail on fed-
eral habeas corpus, notwithstanding state court rulings to the con-
trary. 117 But as a practical and legal matter, in an AEDPA-governed
world the primary venue for the adjudication of such claims is likely to
be the state courts. Hence, if the right to effective representation at
state capital sentencing is to become a reality, it will have to be en-
forced in state postconviction proceedings by competent lawyers capa-
ble of deploying resources to make those proceedings meaningful. 118
Because state postconviction review proceedings are of such criti-
cal importance to the just administration of the death penalty,119 the
Guidelines, which "embody the current consensus about what is re-
quired to provide effective defense representation in capital cases," 120
procedural rules," Roger Berkowitz, Error-Centricity, Habeas Corpus, and The Rule of Law as
The Law of Rulings, 64 LA. L. REv. 477, 514 (2004), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
clarify the doctrine, see House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991. An opinion will presumably be
forthcoming during the 2005 Term.
114 See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
115 See Freedman, supra note 76, at 332 n.33.
116 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. __, , 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (2005); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-25 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000). For a
comprehensive discussion of the importance of a robust application of Sixth Amendment
rights beyond the right to effective assistance of counsel at capital sentencing proceedings,
see John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105
COLUM. L. RaV. 1967 (2005).
117 See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at ... 125 S. Ct. at 2462, 2467; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
518-22, 526-31; Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-99.
118 In Wiggins, for example, the Court relied heavily on an elaborate social history
report presented in state postconviction proceedings by an expert social worker who had
collected the powerful mitigation evidence that trial counsel had failed to discover. See 539
U.S. at 516-17.
119 See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 932-35, 1085-87; Freedman, supra note 76, at
328-32.
120 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 920.
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mandate that death penalty jurisdictions furnish "high quality legal
representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execu-
tion of a death sentence" throughout each and every phase of the
case, including on state postconviction review. 12 1 Tellingly, the Guide-
lines pointedly advise counsel to test aggressively the boundaries of
Giarratano by challenging as a federal constitutional violation states'
failure to appoint competent counsel for capital postconviction
petitioners.1 22
The Court should agree with the bar that attempting to retain
Giarratano as a component of a just contemporary capital punishment
system makes as much sense as attempting to retain vacuum tubes as a
component of computers. 123
VI
TAKING AN INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT
In a period when the Supreme Court has become increasingly
sensitive to legal trends in the world community,1 24 it seems appropri-
ate to end by discussing how Giarratano would be considered abroad.
121 Id. at 919.
122 See id. at 932 n.47, 1081 n.333.
123 See Freedman, supra note 76, at 327 ("There is a right to the effective assistance of
counsel beyond direct appeal. The conventional wisdom, that the federal Constitution
guarantees no such right and therefore none exists, is flawed on multiple levels. It is a
perilous foundation on which to ground any legal conclusion, and an unacceptable one on
which to build a just system for adjudicating capital cases."); Clive A. Stafford Smith &
R~my Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending That Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves
in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 Lov. L. REV. 55, 56 (1999).
124 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (taking note of the world
community's views on the juvenile death penalty in the course of overruling Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and determining that executing offenders younger than
eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment). For a few summaries of this much discussed
trend, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1989, 1989 (2004); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking
Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329, 329-30, 335-37 (2004);John K. Setear, A Forest With No Trees: The
Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REv. 579, 580-84 (2005);
David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights Law Perspective on Grutter and Gratz, 21
CoNsT. COMMENT. 275, 275-281 (2004); see alsoJoseph Brossart, Death is Different An Essay
Considering the Propriety of Utilizing Foreign Case Law in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 29 U.
DAYTON L. RaV. 345 (2004) (discussing how the Court should use international case law in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment); Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World, U.S.A.
TODAY, June 20, 2005, at 15A (discussing the debate over whether the Court should rely on
foreign law in interpreting the Constitution).
In light of my suggestion that Giarratano today is like Bowers v. Hardwick before Law-
rence v. Texas overruled it, supra text accompanying notes 5-7, it is intriguing that Professor
Leonard sees part of the reason for the shift between Bowers and Lawrence in a greater
willingness on the part of the Court to allow itself to be influenced by foreign legal devel-
opments, see Arthur S. Leonard, The Impact of International Human Rights Developments on
Sexual Minority Rights, 49 N.Y.L. ScH-. L. Rv. 525 (2005), a view that certainly finds support
in the text of Lawrence, see 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003). See generally Charlene
Smith &James Wilets, Lessons from the Past and Strategies for the Future: Using Domestic, Interna-
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In recent decades, international law has sharpened its focus on
the importance of scrupulous adherence to procedural fairness in
capital cases and the significance of the right to counsel in all criminal
proceedings, even noncapital ones involving only the discretionary
considerations of abstract legal issues.' 25 Of course, capital punish-
ment is a fading phenomenon on the world scene and there is reason
to believe that a jus cogens norm is developing against it.126 But the
authorities that recognize its continued existence also recognize that
[c]apital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered ... after legal process which gives all possible
safeguards to ensure a fair trial, . .. including the right of anyone
suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment
may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the
proceedings. 127
Authority supporting the right to counsel in noncapital cases would
thus apply a fortiori to capital cases.
Ample authority lies close to hand. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), adjudicating cases arising from countries
where the death penalty does not exist, has for some years been highly
active in enforcing the right to counsel under Article 6(3) (c) of the
Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 128 The ECHR's goal has been to ensure
that the contests between governments and individuals take place on a
level field; "equality of arms" seems to be the preferred term. 129 The
ECHR has accordingly found governments in violation of the Conven-
tion for denying individuals counsel in both legally complicated
cases' 30 and simple ones, 31 in situations where the proceedings were
in high courts solely concerned with legal rules of general applicabil-
ity,' 32 and even when a petitioner's attack was on the trial court's exer-
tional and Comparative Law to Overturn Sodomy Laws, 24 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 49 (2000) (dis-
cussing how to incorporate international and comparative law into attacks on domestic
sodomy laws).
125 See infra text accompanying notes 130-33.
126 See Geoffrey Sawyer, Comment, The Death Penalty is Dead Wrong: Jus Cogens Norms and
the Evolving Standard of Decency, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 459 (2004).
127 E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, annex, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc.
E/1984/84 (May 25, 1984); seeJohn Quigley, Exclusion of Death-Scrupled Jurors and Interna-
tional Due Process, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261, 280-81 (2004).
128 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 6(3) (c), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Everyone charged with a
criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . .if he has not sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require .... ").
129 See, e.g., Delcourt Case, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1970); Case of Monnell &
Morris, 115 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1987).
130 See Granger Case, 174 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (1990).
131 See Boner v. United Kingdom, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. 66, 75 (1994).
132 See Pakelli Case, 64 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17-18 (1983).
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cise of discretion and therefore unlikely to succeed. 3 3 Intriguingly,
the ECHR has rejected as inadequate a system quite similar to that at
issue in Giarratano, in which the burden was on pro se applicants to
show prima facie merit to their appeals before the law required courts
to assign lawyers to study the files. 134
Considering that these cases arose in an environment in which a
five-year prison sentence was deemed a situation in which there can
be "no question as to the importance of what was at stake in the ap-
peal" 135 and in light of the scrupulous nature of international due
process requirements for imposing the death penalty, as well as the
legal complexity and serious consequences of state capital postconvic-
tion proceedings, 13 6 it seems quite plain that in failing to provide
counsel in those proceedings America falls woefully short of the legal
standards that other democracies impose upon themselves.
CONCLUSION
Scarecrows may for a time frighten crows into going hungry. But
intelligent crows learn from experience to ignore scarecrows, and
eventually intelligent farmers conclude that their maintenance is
counterproductive. Giarratano is a scarecrow, a precedent as hollow as
was Bowers13 7 long before Lawrence 3 8 interred its lifeless husk. Intelli-
gent lawyers, judges, and legislators should not allow Giarratano to di-
vert them from doing what justice requires, and the Supreme Court
should abandon it.
133 See Boner, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 75; id at 79-80 (Sir John Freeland, concurring).
134 See Pham Hoang v. France, 243 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17-19 (1992).
135 Granger, 174 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18.
136 See supra note 108 and text accompanying notes 94-104.
137 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
138 539 U.S. 558.
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